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Introduction
The incidence of long-term care is a turning point in a person's life. Apart from the associated physical and emotional burdens, long-term care constitutes a severe nancial risk. The costs for care, room, and board in an institutional care facility can easily exceed 3,000 Euros per month. However, the statutory long-term care insurance only covers care costs up to a certain limit. Depending on the degree of care needs the insurance covers up to 1,510 Euro per month for institutional care. Thus, income or wealth of care recipients may fall short of care-related expenses. In this case, the nancial burden will have to be borne by relatives or, ultimately, by social assistance. On the macro level, the future burden associated with long-term care is bound to rise considerably. Projections show that under favorable demographic conditions and constant age-specic prevalence rates, the number of care recipients in Germany will double by the year 2050, while the numbers of potential care givers and contributors to the unfunded insurance system are going to shrink. This will drive up the care-dependency ratio threefold (Schnabel, 2007) . Consequently, the nancing and the organization of long-term care is a political and economic challenge for ageing societies such as Germany. While this macro-level development of long-term care has received notable attention during the past years, the micro-level perspective has been widely ignored.
In order to ll this gap, this paper investigates individual nancial provision gaps for long-term care in Germany. Using data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) 1 as well as federal and state-level statistics from multiple sources, we calculate care probabilities for dierent care levels and care arrangements on an individual basis. We dierentiate between statutorily and privately insured persons, which dier considerably in mortality and morbidity. Subsequently, we calculate expected care costs and payments by the care insurance for each person in our micro data. Finally, we contrast these results with individual information on wealth so that we are able to identify provision gaps related to long-term care expenditure. The fundamental question to be addressed is whether elder German individuals are able to cover their expected costs for long-term care by ownnancial resources and payments of the care insurance or whether relatives or social assistance have to ll the nancial gaps. Thereby, we distinguish three policy scenarios which assume dierent developments of care costs and public transfers.
Our analysis extends the literature in several ways. First, we estimate care prevalence dierentiated by gender, age, state, and insurance status based on a variety of statistical sources. We also use life-tables by age, gender, and insurance status. On a very detailed basis, we account for dierent care levels (indicating the severity of care needs) and care arrangements (informal, formal home-based, and institutional care). The main contribution is to link the nancial burdens caused by long-term care to the nancial resources of individuals. Although we focus on the German SHARE data, our results (esp. care probabilities, expected care costs, and out-of-pocket expenses) can easily be applied to other datasets as well. This paper constitutes an important contribution to the debate on the future of the German care insurance and the individuals' provision gaps in care. It is the rst one to estimate expected care costs on an individual basis and to calculate future nancial burdens to carerecipients which hints to costs possibly transferred to their rst-degree relatives and to the social security system.
In the benchmark scenario in which costs and transfers exhibit an annual growth equal to the ination rate, our ndings suggest expected total care costs of about 54,800 Euros for women and 17,400 Euros for men at the brink of retirement (65 years). While the care insurance will pick up a little more than half of that bill in the case of the statutorily insured, individuals have to bear average care costs of about 24,300 Euros (females) and 6,700 Euros (males). Taking the entire sample (which includes individuals aged 65-97), average expected care costs amount to 45,700 Euros; the mean nancial burden to be covered individually is 20,000 Euros. Consequently, about a third of the weighted sample faces a provision gap meaning that the expected out-of-pocket-expenses exceed the total wealth of these people. Among homeowners, nancial resources and non-housing assets fall short of care expenses. As a consequence, these individuals or their heirs will have to liquidate the care-recipient's main residence and use at least part of the realized returns to nance long-term care. As expected, these gures are more pronounced for mandatorily insured individuals since they are usually less wealthy than privately insured people. In addition, we nd that females and individuals in single households are more likely to face future provision gaps.
Since these gaps are in terms of expected value, they are at the same time estimates of fair insurance premia that would be required to cover the long-term care risk. Thus, they indicate whether or not a person has the resources to pay a fair insurance premium without cutting consumption. Our analysis indicates that a large fraction of the German population would not be able to pay the insurance premium out of nancial wealth. Thus, these persons would have to cut consumption over the life-cycle in order to pay fair insurances premia. If individuals start to save for long-term care needs at the age of 45, the yearly premium would 5 be in the order of 1,002 Euros for women and 274 Euros for men. 2 The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides a literature overview on care probabilities and the development of care costs on the macro level while the SHARE data are introduced in Section 3. Section 4 presents the methodology to calculate survival and care probabilities, care costs, and insurance payments. Section 5 discusses the results and Section 6 concludes.
Literature review
Several recent studies undertake macro projections on the development of the prevalence of care recipients, the potential of care givers and the demand for employees in institutional and outpatient professional care services, e.g., Eisen (2007) , Hackmann and Moog (2009), Häcker and Raelhüschen (2006) , Raelhüschen (2007) , Schnabel (2007) . Based on these projections, provision gaps in care potential (people available for giving informal care) and, in the wake of this development, increasing costs to the public care insurance are forecasted.
Dierent scenarios in this respect depend on dierent assumptions on the demographic development for e.g., fertility, employment rates, life expectancies and mortality rates, as well as incidence and prevalence rates in long-term care. At the same time, these assumptions correspond to dierent hypotheses on the development of age-specic care prevalence rates and therefore care-related expenditure. 3 Breyer and Felder (2006) name constant care probabilities despite a rise in life expectancy the status-quo hypothesis. Verbrugge (1984) was the rst who described the so-called medicalization hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, increasing life expectancies will lead to a higher demand for long-term care services which will nevertheless go in line with worse age-specic health states and increased care prevalence rates. On the contrary, the compression-of-morbidity hypothesis, which was rst described by Fries (1980) , implies a jump in morbidity only shortly before the individual's point-ofdeath. Age-specic prevalence rates are thus deferred to a constant or shorter time period before death. In a literature overview of selected papers, Hackmann and Moog (2009) state that more evidence can be found for the compression-of-morbidity hypothesis than for the medicalization hypothesis. They also nd evidence for the status-quo hypothesis. However, Werblow et al. (2007) illustrate that the demand for long-term care diers from the demand for health care as the former is rather correlated to age than to the individual's proximity to death. Therefore, the medicalization hypothesis might apply in the case of long-term care expenditure. Whichever hypothesis and scenario prevails, all projections mentioned above nd an increase in the number of care recipients that leads to a gap between the budget of the social care insurance and the unknown extent to which the costs of care will increase. Contrary to the macroeconomic perspective on the provision gap, this paper explores how the individual is nancially aected under the current situation. We assume constant age-specic care prevalence rates in our sample. This is in line with data from the Federal Ministry of Health which shows that the age-specic distribution over care levels remains stable over the years 2001 to 2008. The share of care recipients using professional homebased care relative to institutional care has remained constant in this period as well. In addition, we keep the costs of care services constant. Although Hackmann and Moog (2009) nd that moderate compression on morbidity is the hypothesis that is most often conrmed in the health expenditure literature, a disproportionately high increase in care expenditure is not unlikely (Werblow et al., 2007) . Individual costs can be even more aected by this development if the adjustment of care allowance payments by the social care insurance does not compensate for this eect. 4 In our analysis, we address this important issue by applying three policy scenarios with dierent cost increases in the long-term care sector without sufcient compensation payments by the care insurance; these scenarios are explained in detail in Section 4.2.
3 Data and construction of the sample The Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) is a multidisciplinary panel database of micro data on health, socio-economic status, and social as well as family networks of more than 30,000 individuals aged 50 and over. Otherwise, we cannot be sure that the household has indeed a joint budget and a joint wealth position. We exclude the lowest and highest percentile of total net wealth from the sample to reduce the risk that outliers drive the results. 2006) . These gures discriminate between age and gender. Agespecic survival probabilities are reported until the age of 100. However, a 100-year-old individual has a survival probability larger than zero so that we assume constant survival probabilities until the age of 120. This means that a 105-year-old woman has the same probability to reach the age of 106 as a 100-year-old woman has to reach the age of 101. At the age of 120, we assume a survival probability of zero. Given the age for each individual in the observation period 2004, we calculate conditional probabilities to reach any age until 120. For example, the probability for an 87-year-old person to reach the age of 89 is her probability to reach the age of 88 multiplied with the probability to survive from age 88 to 89. In practice, the individuals in our sample have a calculated positive probability to reach ages above 100 years. However, reaching the age of 120 years is very unlikely for any observed age in our dataset given the very low survival probabilities for the age of 100. All in all, this seems to be a quite reliable reproduction of reality. Furthermore, we discriminate mortality between statutorily insured and privately insured people. Privately insured individuals are usually wealthier, better educated, and have a higher income. Applying the same survival probabilities to the entire sample would neglect the well-known fact that wealthier people have a higher live expectancy (as shown by e.g., Attanasio et al., 2003) . We therefore correct the survival probabilities taken from the cohort life tables for the group of privately and for the group of statutorily insured people by applying an age-specic correction factor. This factor is calculated using period life tables of the private health insurance.
do not discriminate between the health insurance status. Therefore, we use the additional information on the heterogeneity of mortality included in the period life tables of the private health insurers.
To sum up, for each individual we obtain the probability to reach a certain age given age, gender, and health insurance status in 2004.
Care prevalence
The German social care insurance dierentiates between three dierent care levels which correspond to the severity of an individual's disability. Care level I is the lowest level which is assigned to an individual that needs support due to physical limitations in personal care for at least 90 minutes per day and help in housework for several times a week. Care level III implies round-the-clock personal care also at night (German Social Code, SGB XI, 15). Public transfers from the care insurance increase with the care level but, in addition, they dier by the care arrangement chosen by the care recipient. Impaired individuals who choose informal care given by their family, friends, or neighbors receive fewer transfers than those who receive professional home-based care or institutional care. Consequently, not only longterm care transfers but also individual costs dier substantially depending on care levels and care arrangements. Figure 1 illustrates the distribution of the 2.08 million care recipients in our population statistics. 69 percent of them receive home-based care and about 35 percent of these use professional care services. In both home-based care categories, namely informal care and professional care, more than 50 percent of individuals are ranked into care level I. More than 30 percent have care needs according to care level II. Care level III comprises only around 10 percent of people. 31 percent of the dataset receive institutional care. Contrary to the home-based care categories, only 35 percent of stationary care recipients are ranked into care level I. Care level II comprises most of the individuals, namely 44 percent. The share of those needing assistance according to care level III has in addition doubled in comparison to home-based care support. These numbers are marginally dierent from ocial statistics as we only use care recipients who can be clearly segmented into one of the three care arrangements. 7 Below the numbers on the distribution of care recipients, mean individual costs and the amount of public transfers are shown by care arrangement and care level. We dierentiate by insurance type (public or private), since mortality and morbidity dier substantially between these groups. We are able to calculate heterogenous mortality rates and we can also do this for care in the case of professional home-based and institutional care.
Using one without the other does not make sense, because mortality and morbidity (and care prevalence) are systematically linked. Persons with higher mortality tend to become disabled earlier in the life cycle than those with lower mortality as the comparison of privately and publicly insured individuals shows. Thus, we use heterogeneous care prevalence rates if possible. Figure 3 illustrates that the development of unweighted care prevalence rates is quite similar for statutorily and privately insured individuals up to the age of 90.
Even older individuals in the private care insurance have higher morbidity rates than the statutorily insured. The dierence amounts to about 10 percentage points. After the age of 95, statutorily insured individuals have higher care prevalence rates. The population gures are also subdivided by insurance status. We employ the agespecic share of privately to statutorily insured individuals for this purpose. These are constant ratios over ve-year age groups. To receive federal-state-specic numbers, we weight by the share of the federal-state-specic population of those aged 65 and older. Unfortunately, we do not have private care insurance statistics on the number of care recipients that receive informal home care. Therefore, prevalence rates for informal care are the same for statutorily and privately insured individuals but dier for professional home-based and institutional care.
To give an example, a 90-year-old man in Baden-Wurttemberg who is statutorily insured has a probability of receiving professional home-based care in care level II of 3.0 percent. The care probability of a man of the same age in Thuringia for the same category reaches 5.1 percent. If he was a member of the private health and care insurance, these probabilities would be 8.9 and 10.1 percent, respectively. double counting. Therefore our total number of care recipients is lower than the total number of the national care statistic for 2005 presenting the results for whole Germany (Federal Statistic Oce (ed.), 2007b). 9 We use care recipient and insurance statistics for 2004 provided by the association of private health insurances in Germany (PKV Verband). 10 As these comprise 16 dierent documents, we refer the reader to the reference list for further bibliographic details. 13 
Care costs
The total costs of care can be divided into costs that are covered by the compulsory insurance and into costs that have to be borne by the care recipient. These rules are the same for the two branches of the German care insurance. The two sub-systems dier in the way the expenditures are nanced. The social insurance levies earnings-related contributions (currently 1.95 percent of earnings or pensions with a 0.25 percent supplement for childless persons). The private insurance is fully funded and charges uniform insurance premia unrelated to income.
The two insurance pools dier in many respects. With minor exceptions, people insured in the statutory health insurance belong to the social care insurance (with the same insurer). Accordingly, people with a private health insurance status usually have a compulsory private long-term care insurance contract. Thus, we can use information on the heterogeneity of the people in the two health insurance systems (e.g., mortality, see Section 4.1; morbidity, see Section 4.2) to draw conclusions for the care insurance systems which are in the focus of this paper. As we have seen, life expectancy in the private branch is considerably higher.
While the maximum insurance benets can easily be found (SGB XI, 28 ), it is very dicult to assess actual costs. Thus, we have to gather this information from several sources. Institutional care costs for each care level and federal state are taken from a scientic expertise on behalf of the Ministry of Labour, Health and Social Aairs in NorthrhineWestfalia (Augurzky et al., 2007) . The transfer amount from the public care insurance is subtracted from this measure. We calculate costs for professional home-based care by dividing the aggregate expenditure of private households on professional care in 2005, taken from the Statistical Yearbook 2007 (Federal Statistical Oce (ed.), 2007c), by the respective number of care recipients. Beforehand, the aggregate expenses are weighted by the expenditure structure that the public transfer assigns to the dierent care levels. The same procedure is used to calculate care-level-specic individual costs for informal care. 11 Using the ageprole of the prevalence of care by sex, federal state, insurance status and a care level and arrangement combination as well as the costs of care and the survival probabilities according to the insurance status, it is possible to calculate the expected expenditure discounted to the current age of each person.
Let a i be the age of individual i in year 2004. The conditional survival probability s i is the probability to reach at least age a given that the person is a i years old (here in the sample at year 2004); the index i allows for individual-specic survival rates.
p j (a) is the probability to receive care at age a (given that one is still alive), and c j (a) is the cost incurred in a certain care arrangement and a certain care level. As there are three dierent levels of care and three care arrangements, we end up with nine possible care combinations which we denote with the index j. p j (a) * c j (a) are replaced by the sum over these possible states j. Furthermore, the care probabilities and care costs vary by federal state k. All in all, expected care costs of individual i are calculated as follows:
ai−a (1) Due to our sample design and the data availability, this gure accounts for gender, age, the insurance-system-specic survival probability, federal state and individual costs distinguished by care level, care arrangement and the individual's insurance status.
Since we aim to 
Household wealth
SHARE includes a very detailed questionnaire on wealth and assets. Household net wealth is an aggregated gure combining both real assets (owner-occupied housing wealth and related mortgage debt, further real estate, cars, business shares) and nancial assets (building loan contracts, banking accounts, life insurances, government bonds, stocks, shares, mutual funds, individual retirement accounts, and non-mortgage debt). The corresponding individual wealth is household wealth divided by the number of household members. The descriptive wealth gures are displayed in Table 2 . The weighted average individual in our sample owns 126,654 Euros; the median net wealth is 54,719 Euros. About 78 percent (mean) and 34 percent (median) of individual net wealth belong to real assets. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of care recipients over care arrangements as well as care levels for men and women, respectively. Like in Figure 1 , the calculations are based on the data collected from multiple national statistics. Overall, the probability to become a care recipient grows with the age of an individual. It increases sharply for all individuals older than 85 years. The increase in care level I is, however, much more pronounced for women than for men. Drops in the line graph correspond to dying individuals: Those who are in a better condition survive which means that the care prevalence rate starts to rise again from a lower level. Overall, women have a considerable higher risk of becoming a care recipient as their average life expectancy is higher than for men. They are much more likely to receive informal home care. Between 85 and 95 years of age, most care recipients are ranked into care level I. After this age, the prevalences of care level I and II are very close to each other. Care level III is much less common for both sexes.
Expected care costs and transfers
Using mortality rates, prevalence rates, as well as care costs and transfers in a certain care level and arrangement combination, we calculate the total expected care costs until death for each individual in our dataset as described in the previous sections. Table 3 displays the total and individual expected care costs, as well as expected public transfers for the sample. In our scenario 1, the statutorily insured individuals in the SHARE sample will face average total expected care costs of 45,915 Euros. While the care insurances will probably carry 25,725 Euros of these costs, the remaining nancial burden to be covered individually amounts to about 20, 190 Euros. Thus, the average public share of future care costs is 59 percent. The respective median gures are lower than the mean values (33, Looking at scenario 2 and scenario 3 reveals much higher nancial burdens due to longterm care that are directly imposed on the future care recipients since we keep public transfers (in real terms) constant. Average total expected care costs amount to 68,276 Euros with an individual part of 42,594 Euros (scenario 3, full sample). Consequently, the public share of total care costs reduces to 40 percent.
Provision gaps
Comparing the expected nancial burdens that will not be covered by the care insurance with individual wealth allows us to detect provision gaps for future long-term care burdens. These results are displayed in Table 4 .
We start with our benchmark scenario in which public transfers and care costs have a real annual growth rate of zero percent. First, about a third of the statutorily insured individuals in our sample have a provision gap in the sense that these people will be unable to defray their costs for long-term care by themselves. If the income of the aected people is not adequate to close these gaps, the remaining nancial burdens must be carried by their family , especially by their children, or, in the end, by social assistance. The picture is by far less severe for the privately insured individuals: only 14 percent of them will not be able to nance their future care costs with their own assets. Second, 38.6 percent of the statutorily insured homeowners will have to downsize their main residence in order to meet care expenses since their nancial assets and non-housing wealth will not be sucient to cover expected care costs. The same holds for 25.8 percent of the privately insured homeowners. Overall, this shows that care costs do heavily aect future bequests and may collide with expectations of both the testator and the beneciaries even without a provision gap. Again, the results are more drastic in the remaining policy scenarios (Table 4) . In both scenarios, the share of statutorily insured individuals with a provision gap is notably higher compared to our benchmark scenario: 36.9 percent (scenario 2) or 43.1 percent (scenario 3) will face a provision gap; housing wealth will be liquidated in 44.8 percent (scenario 2) or 57.3 percent (scenario 3) of the cases (homeowners only). Among the privately insured, we nd provision gaps in 16.8 percent (scenario 2) and 23.1 percent (scenario 3) of the cases. Furthermore, housing wealth will have to be liquidated in order to cover cost of long-term care in 26.8 (scenario 2) and 36.9 percent (scenario 3) of the cases (homeowners only). 20 
Regression analyses
The results up to this point refer to the entire sample that includes individuals from dierent age groups. In this section, we have a look at the link between wealth and care costs as well as on the determinants of provision gaps for long-term care expenses. While the people in our sample have reached a position in their life-cycle in which the occurrence of a provision gap is more or less inevitable, younger cohorts may reduce current consumption in order to self-insure against future nancial burdens. Therefore, we predict provision gaps for both females and males at dierent ages which can be interpreted as the additional amount of wealth that has to be accumulated by an individual of a certain age in the employment phase to meet nancial needs of long-term care in later life. We conduct OLS regression analyses with robust standard errors for four dierent dependent variables.
To begin with, we regress expected care costs on age, sex, living in East or West Germany, the individual's marital status, the number of children, and whether the individual is privately insured or not. Table 5 illustrates that expected care costs rise with age and with being female. Both ndings are not surprising. However, the size of the marginal eect requires further attention: females face total expected care costs that are (on average) 36,657 Euros higher. The insurance status is not a signicant determinant of total care costs. However, the expected care costs of East Germans are 16,254 Euros lower compared to West Germans. As we do not distinguish mortality rates by federal state, this eect may stem from the lower care prevalence rates in the East German states. Note. Lowest and highest percentile excluded (total net wealth). Dependent variable: total care costs for long-term care
(expected care costs to be covered individually plus expected transfers by the public long-term care insurance). PKV: privately insured. Data source: SHARE 2004.
In Table 6 , we illustrate predicted expected care costs for both sexes at the age of 65 to 90 at intervals of ve years (scenario 1). We nd that dierences in total expected care costs as well as in individual cost burdens between women and men are relatively stable over the dierent ages; however, these dierences are dramatic: at any given age between 65 and 90, a woman faces total expected care costs that are more than 34,000 Euros higher compared to a man at the same age. About half of this amount has to be carried individually. The dierences between the two sexes peak at the age of 90 with a cost dierence of more than 41,600 Euros. Note. Lowest and highest percentile excluded (total net wealth). Predicted expected care costs at a given age. Data source:
We use the same list of explanatory variables to analyze the determinants of having a provision gap. Table 7 shows that the probability to have a provision gap increases with age.
Furthermore, being female increases the probability of facing a provision gap by about 16.6 percentage points; living alone leads to a similar increase of 18 percentage points. One should also keep in mind that woman are more likely to live alone as they have a higher life expectancy. Individuals who are privately insured are 10.2 percentage points less likely to face a provision gap. This stems from the simple fact that the privately insured are much wealthier than the statutorily insured individuals.
In Lastly, we regress total net wealth on the explanatory variables used before as well as on expected individual care costs. The results are provided in Table 9 . As the coecient of the individual cost burden is insignicant, we can conclude that higher expected individual care costs do not inuence savings and, thereby, the accumulation of wealth. Individual savings behavior does not respond to the necessity to prepare for expected nancial burdens due to long-term care.
Conclusion
This paper investigates provision gaps for long-term care. Due to the introduction of the German social care insurance in 1995, a large share of care costs is paid by insurance payments.
However, people have to bear the remaining individual nancial burden by themselves. Using German data from the SHARE survey and multiple ocial statistics, we rst calculate expected total care costs, expected insurance payments, and remaining provision needs until death. Thereby, we rely on survival probabilities derived from cohort life tables (which distinguish between age and gender) and we further dierentiate between privately and statutorily insured people. Furthermore, we use federal state statistics on care probabilities for dierent care levels (degrees of care dependency), care arrangements, insurance status, and associated costs. We then compare the resulting expected total care costs, public transfers, and remaining burdens to be carried by the insured individuals themselves with individual wealth gures of the sample population.
Thereby, our benchmark scenario assumes real growth rates of zero percent for care costs and transfers. We provide results for two additional policy scenarios assuming that future cost increases exceed increases in payments by the care insurance (which has indeed been the case since the introduction of the German long-term care insurance). In the following Especially this latter nding encourages our analysis on private provision gaps as there are good reasons to believe that most people are not aware of the costs that care can incur in later life rather than neglecting precautionary savings on purpose. However, a large fraction of the population may not have an incentive to build up wealth for long-term care reasons.
Individuals with low wealth may act rationally since own savings eorts to close the private provision gap would require notable cuts of consumption expenditure. The incentive to self-insure may be low if social assistance is of acceptable quality and provides the required nancial means (moral hazard problem). Similarly, individuals with high amounts of wealth are likely to cover their long-term care costs anyway so that there is no need for extra saving eorts due to the risk of long-term care.
12
12 Meier (1996) formulates these eects on a theoretical basis when a social aid regime or a compulsory care insurance is introduced in a context in which individuals can only choose voluntary private care insurance beforehand.
Without doubt, the nancial burdens of long-term care expenditure for both public and individual budgets will drastically rise in the following years. This paper is a rst step to combine statistical gures from life tables, care probabilities, care costs, and insurance payments with individual data on socio-demographic conditions and wealth. Future work should rst concentrate on the improvement of data availability and quality. This includes heterogeneous care probabilities for informal care provision, more detailed specications of costs of care, as well as precise information on income and expenditure dynamics of the care recipients and their relatives to follow the nancial burdens due to long-term care on the individual level. This would help people to make better-informed insurance decisions instead of fearing a diuse disability scenario in old age.
